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Dispute Concerning Japan’s JARPA II Program of “Scientific 
Whaling” 
(Australia v. Japan): A Backgrounder 
 
By Donald K. Anton•
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 The international legal story of whales has been a fascinating 
(and often disquieting) episode in the development of international law.  
For over 100 years the international community has struggled to reverse 
the decline of whale populations caused by over-exploitation and, more 
recently, to conserve whales for their own sake.  The first 19th Century 
unilateral attempts at utilitarian conservation failed because of the 
migratory nature of whales and the doctrine of freedom of fishing and 
its “tragedy of the commons” consequences.1  At the turn of the 20th 
Century, the economic interest of whalers generated the first attempt at 
“international regulation” of overproduction by private inter-company 
agreements, but these were largely unsuccessful because too many “free 
riders” stayed out.2  The first multilateral whale treaty, the Convention 
for the Regulation of Whaling, was adopted in 1931.3  It did apply to 
“all waters of the world,” but was otherwise so limited in scope and 
weak in enforcement that the decline of whales continued and 
extinction of a number of the eleven species of baleen whales looked 
increasingly likely.4
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1 The doctrine of freedom was on full view in the Bering Fur Seals Arbitration.  See 
Award and Declarations of the Arbitral Tribunal, 15 August 1893, 1 INT’L ENVTL. L. 
REP. 67, 70 (1999).  For the classic formulation of the tragedy of the commons see, of 
course, Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 
2  WRAY VAMPLEW, SALVESEN OF LEITH 198 (1975). 
 
3 155 L.N.T.S. 349, 49 Stat. 3079, TS No. 880. 
 
4 PATRICIA BIRNIE, 1 INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING 129-30 (1985). 
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 As a result, the fourteen states then whaling (including Australia 
and Japan), desiring to ensure the continuing viability of commercial 
whaling, adopted the International Convention on the Regulation of 
Whaling (ICRW) in 1946.5  A number of important advances were 
made over the 1931 Convention, but the two most important new 
features were: a) the International Whaling Commission (IWC) as an 
institutional decision-making body (Art. III), and b) the “schedule” of 
regulations to limit and control whaling, treated as part of the 
Convention, but amendable on an annual basis by a three-fourths 
majority vote by the IWC on the basis of scientific “findings.”  The 
amendments are binding unless a party opts out by objection. (Arts. I 
and V).  Despite these and other improvements, so long as whaling was 
assumed to be a form of fishing and the primary object of the parties 
was “the orderly development of the whaling industry”6 – as opposed to 
the protection of whales – the decline of whale populations continued 
under the ICRW.7
 In the late 1960s the object of the parties (or at least some of 
them) did, in fact, begin to shift from one of sustained exploitation to 
outright protection.  One impetus was the 1972 U.N. Conference on the 
Human Environment in Stockholm, which called for a 10 year 
moratorium on commercial whaling in order to give decimated stocks 
breathing space.8  Ten years later, as the number of non-whaling states 
continued to accede to the ICRW, the IWC established a global 
moratorium on commercial whaling by amending the Schedule under 
Art. V, which came into force in the 1985-86 whaling season.9  The 
moratorium, however, did not appear to be a permanent ban.10  Rather, 
                                                      
5 161 U.N.T.S. 72, 62 Stat. 1716, TIAS No. 1849. 
 
6 Id., Preamble. 
 
7 Sebastian Oberthür, The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: 
From Over Exploitation to Total Prohibition, YB. INT’L CO-OP. ENV. & DEV. 29 
(1998/99). 
 
8 Recommendation 33, Action Plan for the Human Environment, Report of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment at 12, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (June 5-16, 1972). 
 
9 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Schedule (as amended June 
2009), para. 10(e), http://iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/schedule.pdf 
(hereafter “Schedule”). 
 
10 Indeed, there is no specific reference to a power to premanently end whaling in the 
ICRW and such action would appear to belie the state object of the Convention. 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
Anton – Australia v. Japan  
_____________________________________________________________________ 3 
it seemed to be a cessation of whaling for an interim period to be kept 
under scientific review.  Under the terms of the Schedule, by 1990 the 
IWC was “to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of 
[the moratorium] on whale stocks and consider modification of this 
provision and the establishment of other catch limits.”11  
 The long-running contest between whaling states and anti-
whaling states over limited whaling versus no whaling has been a 
source of contention for the International Whaling Commission (IWC) 
for nearly twenty-five years. Most recently, at the 62nd meeting of the 
IWC (June 21-23, 2010) in Agidir, Morocco, negotiations failed over a 
Proposed Consensus Decision12 that would have allowed the return of 
commercial whaling in return for greatly reduced catches and oversight 
by the IWC. Australia’s submission to the ICJ anticipated that 
outcome.13
 
II.  THE WHALING DISPUTE BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN 
 
 The moratorium on commercial whaling also forms the crux of 
the dispute between Australian and Japan over Japan’s continued 
whaling in the Southern Ocean.  When the moratorium was adopted by 
the IWC in 1982, Japan lodged a formal objection under Article V and 
so was not bound by its terms.14   In 1984, in response to the Japanese 
objection, the United States threatened to punish Japan by eliminating 
Japanese fishing in the U.S. exclusive economic zone.  Japan, in turn, 
agreed to withdraw its objection and halt commercial whaling at the 
end of 1987 and did so. At the same time, however, Japan announced 
that it would continue to take hundreds of minke whales each season 
“for purposes of scientific research.”15  Scientific whaling is regulated 
under Article VIII of the ICRW.  It provides that despite anything else 
in the Convention (including the Scheduled moratorium), a party may 
                                                      
11 Schedule, para. 10(e). 
 
12 Proposed Consensus Decision to Improve the Conservation of Whales from the 
Chair and Vice-Chair of the Commission, IWC Doc. IWC/62/7rev (Agenda item 
3)(28/04/10), http://iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/IWC62docs/62-7rev.pdf
 
13 See, e.g., Donald K. Anton, Antarctic Whaling: Australia’s Attempt to Protect 
Whales in the Southern Ocean, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 319, 322-339 (2009). 
 
14 Schedule, para. 10(e) n *,  http://iwcoffice.org/commission/schedule.htm. 
 
15 See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 95 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 132, 150-51 (2001). 
 
__________________________________________________________ 
Anton – Australia v. Japan  
_____________________________________________________________________ 4 
issue a “special permit” authorizing whaling for “scientific research,” 
subject to such conditions as the party “thinks fit” (Art. VIII(1)).   
 
A. Municipal Action 
 
 Australia has long criticized Japan over increasing regular 
annual takes of now over 1000 minke whales in the Southern Ocean.16  
Australia has maintained that Japan’s scientific research whaling is of 
great concern because there are “no agreed abundance estimates for the 
species” and that it is a “sham” for commercial whaling.17  In order to 
provide greater protection for whales under municipal law, in 1999 
Australia passed the Environment Protection Biodiversity Conservation 
Act (EPBC Act),18 which created the Australia Whale Sanctuary 
(AWS) in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), including the EEZ that 
Australia contentiously declared in 1994 adjacent to its Antarctic 
territorial claim.  It is an offence to kill or take whales in the AWS 
under the EPBC Act.   
 Using the EPBC Act, in 2004 Human Society International 
brought a successful action in the Federal Court of Australia to enjoin 
Japanese scientific whaling in the Southern Ocean AWS.  The Federal 
Court found a Japanese whaler to be in violation of the Act and 
enjoined future breaches, but the Commonwealth Government has 
failed to take enforcement action against Japan, presumably because of 
the contentious nature of the predicate claim underlying the Southern 
Ocean AWS.  Neither Japan nor most of the world recognize Australian 
jurisdiction in these waters but regard them as high seas.19
                                                      
16 See Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the National Task Force on Whaling, A 
Universal Metaphor: Australia’s Opposition to Commerical Whaling chap. 2 
(May1997) 
http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/publications/whaling/pubs/whaling.pdf. 
 
17 See, e.g., Australian Antarctic Division, New Australian Research Shows Japan’s 
Scientific Whaling is a Sham (Mar. 28, 2006), 
http://www.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid=21638; Australian Antarctic Division, 
Whaling – Back to the Bad Old Days, Warns Campbell (April 1, 2005), 
http://www.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid=19640. 
 
18 Environmental Protection Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/management.nsf/lookupindexpagesbyid/IP20040
1830?OpenDocument. 
 
19 See Donald K. Anton, False Sancturary: The Australian Antarctic Whale Sanctuary 
and Long-Term Stability, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT L. & POL’Y 17, 18-20 
(2008). 
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B.  ICJ Action 
 
 While this litigation was pending, during the Australian federal 
election campaign in 2007, the Australian Labor Party promised to end 
Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean by international legal action.20  
Once elected, the Labor Government continued to threaten legal action 
against Japan but pursued diplomacy as a first option in the IWC until 
the negotiations surrounding the recent compromise proposal contained 
in the Proposed Consensus Decision21 collapsed in May 2010. 
 On May 31, 2010, Australia finally filed its Application 
Instituting Proceedings against Japan in the Registry of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).22 The commencement of the action 
by Australia brings to a head the dispute (sometimes acrimonious) 
concerning Japan’s annual Southern Ocean whale hunt that has 
persisted over twenty years.23 In general terms, Australia alleges in its 
Application that the implementation of the Second Phase of the 
Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the 
Antarctic (JAPRA II) is a “breach of obligations assumed by Japan 
under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
(“ICRW”), as well as its other international obligations [under the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)] for the preservation of 
marine mammals and the marine environment.”24   
 
1. JAPRA & JAPRA II 
 
 Japan first introduced its Whale Research Program under 
Special Permit in the Antarctic (JAPRA) in the 1987-88 Southern 
Ocean whaling season.  As noted above, JAPRA was necessary because 
Japan withdrew its objection to the IWC moratorium in 1987. From 
                                                      
20 Rod McGuirk, Australia to take Japan to Court over Whaling, The Guardian, 
Friday, May 28, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9100572. 
 
21 Proposed Consensus Decision, supra n.12.   
 
22 Dispute Concerning Japan’s JAPRA II Program of “Scientific Whaling,” 
Application Instituting Proceedings (31 May 2010), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/148/15951.pdf (hereafter Application). 
 
23 See eg Donald K. Anton, Antarctic Whaling: Australia’s Attempt to Protect Whales 
in the Southern Ocean, 36 BOST. COLL. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 319, 322-339 (2009). 
 
24 Application, at para. 2. 
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1987 through 2005, an eighteen year period, over 6800 Antarctic minke 
whales were taken under JAPRA.25  JAPRA II commenced in 2005 
with a two year feasibility study.26 JAPRA II more than doubles the 
JAPRA annual take of minke whales  to 850 ± 10% and expands the 
program to include for the first time the lethal study of humpback and 
fin whales, with annual takes of up to fifty each.27 Humpback whales 
are listed as Annex I species (most threatened) under the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)28 and fin whales 
are listed as endangered on the International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) Red List.29
 As the Australian Application points out, the IWC has adopted a 
number of recommendations concerning JAPRA and JAPRA II under 
Article VI of the ICRW.  In 2003, the IWC called on Japan to halt 
JAPRA, or to ensure that it was limited to non-lethal research.30  The 
IWC adopted further resolutions in 2005 and 2007 that expressed 
concern about the Japanese special permit system of whaling and 
skepticism about the scientific purposes of JAPRA II.  The 2005 
resolution strongly urged Japan not to proceed with lethal whaling 
under JAPRA II.31 The 2007 resolution called upon Japan to suspend 
indefinitely the lethal aspects of JAPRA II conducted in the Southern 
                                                      
25 Resolution on JAPRA II, IWC Res. 2005-1 (2005), para. 6, 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/resolutions/Resolution2005-1.pdf. (Resolution on 
JAPRA II). The resolution expressed concern at this number when “compared to a 
total of 840 whales killed globally by Japan for scientific research in the 31 years 
period prior to the moratorium.” 
 
26 IWC, 59th Annual Meeting of the IWC, Anchorage, U.S., May 28-31, 2007, 
[Revised] Chair’s Summary Report of the 59th Annual Meeting, at 4, n.3, 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/meetings/ChairSummaryReportIWC59rev.pdf. 
 
27 Id., at 5, n.3. 
 
28 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, Appenicies I, II and III 
(valid from 23 June 2010), http://www.cites.org/eng/notif/2010/E007A.pdf. 
 
29 IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, Balaenoptera physalus, 
http://www.iucnredlist.org/apps/redlist/details/2478/0 (endangered). 
 
30 Resolution on Southern Hemisphere Minke Whales and Special Permit Whaling, 
IWC Res. 2003-3, 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/resolutions/resolution2003.htm#3. 
 
31 Resolution on JAPRA II, supra note 4;  
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Ocean Whale Sanctuary.32  Perhaps not surprisingly, Japan has opted to 
continue with its scientific research whaling. 
 
 2.  The Particulars of Japan’s Alleged Breaches 
 
 The Application Instituting Proceedings begins by briefly 
introducing the general nature of its claim and the Court’s jurisdiction, 
which is not likely to be subject to a preliminary objection. The 
Application then outlines the content of its dispute with Japan.  It 
recounts obligations of Japan under Article V and the moratorium and 
the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary established by the Schedule to the 
ICRW. It is curiously silent at this point about specific treaty 
obligations under CITES, CBD and any customary international law 
that are in play.   
 The Application then sets out the conduct of Japan that 
allegedly gives rise to the breaches of its obligations.  It starts by 
characterizing Japan as “ostensibly” ceasing commercial whaling 
following the withdrawal of its objection to the moratorium and the 
commencement of JAPRA as “purported[ly]” legitimized “by reference 
to Article VIII of the ICRW.” The Application then provides a detailed 
account of the development of JAPRA and JAPRA II, including the 
consistently growing catches of minke whales (and addition of fin and 
humpback whales as target species) over the years and the fact that 
whale meat caught under both iterations of the program has been sold 
commercially in Japan. 
 The Application next relates the science Australia relies on as to 
the status of the three whale stocks targeted by JAPRA II.  Australia 
maintains, in relation to minke whales, that there appears to have been a 
substantial decrease in the abundance estimates indicated in the results 
of two circumpolar surveys and the population structure remains 
unknown.  For fin whales (14 of which are alleged to have been taken 
under JAPRA II), Australia maintains that “[v]irtually nothing is known 
about the abundance or recovery of fin whales in the Southern Ocean.” 
It highlights that fin whales have been classified at very high risk of 
extinction by the IUCN.  For humpback whales, Australia 
acknowledges indications of recovery of Antarctic stock in the area 
covered by JAPRA II.  However, it claims that this may be due to 
migration of stocks from other areas in Oceania now depleted and that 
the mixing of stocks makes it impossible to target only whales in stocks 
now recovering. 
                                                      
32 Resolution on JAPRA, IWC Res. 2007-1, 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/resolutions/Resolution2007-1.pdf. 
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 Australia’s Application then recounts the history of IWC 
recommendations on JAPRA, JAPRA II and special permit whaling.  It 
highlights those recommendations in which the IWC has called on or 
urged Japan to abandon JAPRA II.  It claims that these 
recommendations have been repeatedly ignored.   
 The Application then moves to the history of the stalemated 
negotiations over the IWC Proposed Consensus Decision.  It concludes 
“that current and proposed IWC processes cannot resolve the key legal 
issue that is the subject of the dispute between Australia and Japan, 
namely the legality of large-scale “special permit” whaling under 
JAPRA II.”  Finally, picking up on the allegation that Japan has 
ignored the recommendations of the IWC, Australia avers that Japan 
has refused to comply with other bilateral and multilateral requests to 
abandon JAPRA II.  It points out that an Aide Memoire, signed by 30 
states (plus the European Commission), objecting to JAPRA II and 
urging Japan to cease scientific research whaling, was transmitted to 
Japan in late 2007. It also highlights that Australia’s bilateral 
engagement with Japan on the issue has failed to modify or terminate 
Japan’s special permit whaling. 
  
III.  AUSTRALIA’S CASE AND BRIEF ANALYSIS 
  
 Before addressing the case proper, it should be noted that now 
the Proposed Consensus Decision has failed at the IWC meeting in 
Agidir, it has been reported that New Zealand may seek to join 
Australia’s action.33  If this is accurate, additional claims may be 
asserted.  It is interesting that Australia has elected not to invoke 
potential breaches of the 1991 Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic 
Treaty identified by the “Canberra Panel” of independent legal and 
policy experts.34 It has also refrained from asserting any rights it may 
have in the exclusive economic zone it has declared in Antarctic, where 
much of the Japanese Whaling takes place.  Perhaps these items have 
been ignored because Australia wants to avoid any allegation that might 
put its Antarctic claim in potential jeopardy.  If this is true, then it may 
                                                      
33 Sarah Clarke, NZ May Join Australia’s Whale Fight, ABC News, Friday, June 25, 
2010, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/06/25/2936692.htm. 
 
34 Report of the Canberra Panel, Japan’s “Scientific” Whaling Program and the 
Antarctic Treaty System (12 January 2009), 
http://www.ifaw.org/assets/Media_Center/Press_Releases/asset_upload_file187_5177
1.pdf.  Australia also elected not to assert possible breaches of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea that might be available.   
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be that New Zealand will want to avoid these claims too in order to 
avoid contention around the Ross Dependency it claims. 
 Be this as it may, the gravamen of Australia’s Application 
alleges that in “proposing and implementing” JAPRA II, Japan has 
breached obligations contained in the ICRW, the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD), as interpreted in the light of each other 
and customary international law.  One wonders at the outset if Australia 
is including an allegation that the mere proposal of JAPRA II by Japan 
is a separate violation of international law absent any implementation.  
Outside of a request for provisional measures urgently required to 
preserve respective rights and prevent irreparable prejudice, such a 
claim seems a stretch.   
The Court’s jurisdiction seems certain, at least with respect to 
the interpretation of the ICRW.  However, preliminary objections may 
be forthcoming by Japan over the claims tied to CITES and CBD.  
Japan may argue that jurisdiction over these claims is lacking because 
of narrow compromissory clauses and an Australian reservation to its 
declaration under the optional clause.   
The settlement of disputes arising under CITES is limited by 
Article XVIII to negotiation or, with mutual consent, binding 
arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration.  No form of ICJ 
jurisdiction is expressed in CITES.  Recourse to dispute settlement for 
alleged breaches of the CBD is limited under Article 27 to only 
conciliation. Australia made a reservation to its optional clause 
declaration that excludes from ICJ compulsory jurisdiction any dispute 
about which “the parties have agreed . . . to have recourse to some other 
method of peaceful settlement.”35 Thus it seems open to Japan to object 
to jurisdiction on the basis of reciprocity that the CITES and CBD 
compromissory clauses are exclusive and jurisdiction over these claims 
are lacking.36 This might be a problem for Australia’s case directly. It 
                                                      
35 Australian Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory 
(Mar. 22, 2002), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=AU; see also Japanese 
Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory (July 9, 2007), 
available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=JP (“This declaration does 
not apply to disputes which the parties thereto have agreed or shall agree to refer for 
final and binding decision to arbitration or judicial settlement”).  
 
36 See also Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, (N.Z. & Austl. v. Japan), 117 I.L.R. 148 
(ITLOS 1999) (teaching that as a matter of treaty interpretation and lex specialis, 
where dispute settlement provisions in two different treaties come into conflict, the 
more specific provision to the dispute is preferred even if that results in a removal of 
jurisdiction).  Of course, this case does not involve two ordinary dispute settlement 
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also raises potential problems in connection with Australia’s assertion 
that the ICRW must be interpreted in light of CITES and CBD because 
it might be viewed as an application of CITES and CBD through “the 
back door.”  Of course, the Court might take an expansive view of its 
jurisdiction or interpretive powers; and even if it does not, it can 
address any parallel customary international legal obligation or general 
principle that may be reflected in CITES or CBD, particularly CBD 
Art. 3 on the duty not to cause harm. 
 
A. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
 
 Australia maintains that Japan has violated two obligations 
contained in the Schedule to the ICRW, neither of which can be 
excused by the scientific research whaling exception provided in 
Article VIII of the Convention.  First, it is asserted that Japan is in 
violation of the moratorium established by paragraph 10(e) of the 
Schedule in that it has failed to “observe in good faith the zero catch 
limit in relation to the killing of whales for commercial purposes.”37  
Second, it is claimed that Japan has breached the prohibitions 
established in the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary under paragraph 
7(b) of the Schedule by “undertaking commercial whaling of humpback 
and fin whales in the Southern Ocean.”38 No mention is made of minke 
whales because of the Japanese objection to their inclusion in the 
Sanctuary.  More interestingly, Australia concedes that “the JAPRA II 
program has not yet killed any humpback whales,”39 but humpbacks are 
presumably included in the allegations either because Australia can 
prove permits have illegally issued already40 or because humpbacks 
remain part of JARPA II, and Australia is seeking an order from the ICJ 
that Japan cease implementation of the entire program.41
                                                                                                                                  
provisions that may be in conflict.  The optional clause is paramount in my view.  It is 
designed exactly for this type of situation where the Court would not otherwise have 
jurisdiction. 
 
37 Application at para. 36(a). 
 
38 Application at para. 36(b). 
 
39 Application at para. 16. 
 
40 See Peter H. Sand, Japan’s “Research Whaling” in the Antarctic Southern Ocean 
and the North Pacific Ocean in the Face of the Endangered Species Convention 
(CITES), 17 REV. EUR. COMM. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 56, 63 n.66 & accompanying text 
(2008). 
 
41 Application, supra note 1, ¶ 41(a). 
__________________________________________________________ 
Anton – Australia v. Japan  
_____________________________________________________________________ 11 
 As Article VIII of the ICRW allows parties to carry out 
scientific research whaling notwithstanding any other provision of the 
treaty, Australia further claims that Japan’s breaches “cannot be 
justified under Article VIII” for three reasons:  “the scale of the JAPRA 
II program,” “the lack of any demonstrated relevance for the 
conservation and management of whale stocks,” and “the risks 
presented to targeted species and stocks.”42  What are missing from 
Australia’s allegations are precise reasons why and on what basis these 
matters disqualify JAPRA II from either being considered special 
permit scientific research whaling or beyond what Article VIII allows.   
In essence, however, Australia is arguing that Japan has abused its 
rights under Article VIII of the Convention.  Publicists have opined that 
such an action may lie in these general circumstances in order to protect 
whales43 and specifically against Japan for Southern Ocean whaling.44  
Even so, success on a claim based on abuse of rights under Article VIII 
is by no means certain.   
 Certain influential authority questions the independent existence 
and utility of the doctrine of abuse of rights.45 Perhaps more 
importantly, the text of Article VIII authorizes states to issue special 
permits subject to such restrictions and conditions it “thinks fit”.  Such 
a criterion seems to admit of very little, if any, limitation and may make 
it difficult to argue an abuse has occurred.  Of course, things are more 
nuanced than this.  Japan is bound by the obligation of “good faith” and 
as more facts come to light and the case unfolds, it may be that this 
obligation has not been met by Japan in implementing JAPRA II.  It is 
here that whatever proof Australia has that JAPRA II lacks of any 
demonstrated relevance for the conservation and management of whale 
stocks will be especially important.     Notwithstanding these problems, 
looking more closely at Australia’s ICRW claims, it appears that the 
argument will proceed along two lines.   
                                                                                                                                  
 
42 Application at para 37. 
 
43 Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age, 47 MCGILL L. J. 
389, 427-429. 
 
44 Gillian Triggs, Japanese Scientific Whaling: An Abuse of Right or Optimum 
Utilization?, 5 ASIA-PACIFIC J. ENVT’L. L. 33 (2002). 
 
45 See, e.g., BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 121 (1987); IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF 
THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY PART I 51-52 (1983) 
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 First, it seems that Australia is asserting that whaling carried out 
under JAPRA II is not really for a “scientific purpose”, but is instead 
“commercial whaling” prohibited by the Schedule paragraph 10(e) 
moratorium.  Australia will likely point to the ever increasing number 
of whales taken, the increasing range of target species, the increasing 
supply of whale meat to commercial markets in Japan, and the 
economic benefits of employment and capital return in the Japanese 
whaling sector, as indicators of commercial rather than scientific 
purpose.  This argument may depend on whether the characterization of 
JAPRA II as commercial or scientific is a matter of “objective fact” to 
be determined by these sorts of criteria or whether it is a matter for 
Japan to decide.  It will also depend on the evidence adduced by Japan 
that might establish that JAPRA II is, in fact, a bona fide scientific 
program. 
 Second, it appears Australia will claim that JAPRA II is beyond 
what is permitted by Article VIII.  Again, Australia will likely point to 
a variety of factors including most prominently the size of the annual 
takes and the availability of non-lethal alternatives to accomplish the 
same research.  It may argue that the increasing number of whales taken 
(1001 whales in the 2008-09 season according to the latest data) are far 
beyond the requirements of science and belie Japan’s “scientific 
research” claim.  In addition, the viability of non-lethal means of 
research, it may be argued, shows that Japan’s insistence on the right of 
lethal research is a pretext for obtaining whale meat that can be 
processed and sold under Article VIII(2).  If proved, this would tend to 
evince a lack of good faith on the part of Japan. Furthermore, if in fact 
the status of whale stocks covered by JAPRA II is uncertain, the 
precautionary principle will have a bearing and Australia may claim 
that the scale of JAPRA II is contrary to scientific research under the 
ICRW that respects the precautionary principle under international law.  
 Assuming Australia prevails on these ICRW claims, it does not 
mean whaling will be brought to an end in the Southern Ocean.  At 
some level, scientific research whaling is explicitly permitted by Article 
VIII.  If Japan were found to have abused its rights under Article VIII, 
it would still be open to Japan to bring its whaling within whatever 
parameters the Court might establish as consistent with the right. 
 
B. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
 
 The second treaty that Australia claims has been breached (and 
is continuing to be breached) by Japan is CITES.  Australia asserts that 
the proposed taking of humpback whales under JAPRA II violated 
Articles II and III(5) of CITES.  As noted, humpback whales are listed 
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in Appendix I of CITES.  Under Article II(1) of CITES trade in 
Appendix I species “must be subject to particularly strict regulation in 
order not to endanger further their survival and must only be authorized 
in exceptional circumstances.”  Article III(5) only allows Appendix I 
species to be introduced from the sea beyond national jurisdiction into a 
state subject to a number of strict conditions certified by relevant state 
authorities, including that the introduction will not be detrimental to the 
species and that it will not be used for primarily commercial purposes. 
 The invocation of CITES is somewhat puzzling.  At the outset 
the claim is problematic because Australia asserts that much of the 
Southern Ocean in which JAPRA II is carried out is part of Australia’s 
EEZ and thus not beyond the national jurisdiction of a state as required 
by Article III(5) and the definition of trade in Article II.46 Putting this 
aside, though, the claim is still difficult to understand.  It is true that 
JAPRA II may lead to CITES breaches, but it is difficult to see how 
Japan has already breached the Convention, as Australia avers, when 
Japan has yet to take any humpback whales under JAPRA II.  Given 
this posture, it is curious that Australia has not asked the Court for a 
specific declaration that prospective introduction of humpbacks from 
the sea as envisioned by JAPRA II would constitute a breach of CITES. 
Still, it is possible that the claim has relevance because, as noted, 
Australia is seeking an order declaring generally that JARPA II in its 
entirety is in violation of Japan’s obligations. Moreover, a convincing 
case of a CITES breach by Japan exists if it can be proved that 
humpback whale permits have issued.47  
 
C.  The Convention of Biological Diversity 
 
 Finally, Australia alleges that Japan is in violation of obligations 
contained in Articles 3, 5 and 10(b) of the CBD. Article 3 requires 
states to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction and control do not 
                                                      
46 Australia has not alleged that Japan is engaged in international trade of humpbacks 
in the form of export, but rather, that it might introduce them from the sea.  This has 
the same beyond national jurisdiction requirement as Article III(5). 
 
47 Sand, supra note 24. See also Peter H. Sand, “Scientific Whaling”: Whither 
Sanctions for Non-Compliance with International Law? 19 Finnish Y.B. Int’l L. 344 
(2008)(in press; on file with author).  See further, the debate between Dan Goodman, 
Japan’s Research Whaling is Not Unlawful and Does Not Violate CITES Trade Rules, 
13 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 176 (2010) and Vassili Papastavrou and Patrick 
Ramage, Commercial Whaling by Another Name: The Illegality of Japan’s Scientific 
Whaling: Response to Dan Goodman, 13 J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 183 (2010). 
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cause harm to other states or to areas beyond national jurisdiction.  
Article 5 requires states, “as far as possible and as appropriate,” to 
cooperate (including through international organizations) in the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity beyond nations 
jurisdiction.  Article 10(b) requires states, “as far as possible and as 
appropriate,” to adopt measures that avoid or minimize adverse impacts 
on biological diversity.   
 Unfortunately, Australia’s Application is short on any recitation 
of facts that give rise to the alleged CBD breaches by Japan.  In terms 
of the duty not to cause harm under Article 3, it may be that Australia is 
claiming that the seasonal whale harvest in the Southern Ocean is harm 
to the environment itself on account of adverse ecosystem impacts.  
Alternatively, it may be claiming that non-harvesting activities related 
to the implementation of JAPRA II, such as pollution from Japanese 
whalers, are causing environmental harm prohibited by Article 3.  The 
facts proved will be (almost) everything here, especially proof of 
causation, the nature and severity of the harm, and the exercise of due 
diligence by Japan.  As it stands, however, there is a paucity of extant 
authority that supports Australia on the bare allegations of its 
Application. 
  In connection with the obligations imposed by Articles 5 and 
10, their very “soft” nature is apparent in the identical qualifier in each 
provision.  Of course, Articles 5 and 10 do impose binding legal 
obligations.  Absent proof of something specific and egregious on the 
part of Japan, however, it is unlikely that the ICJ will be moved to find 
a breach of either.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is an unfortunate fact that international environmental law’s 
substantive protection still goes only as far as states have consented.  
Sovereignty is still largely a barrier.  As Dan Bodansky recently wrote, 
the international law of the environment is better placed to facilitate 
cooperation and enable observance of its norms, rather than compel 
compliance.48 Australia has advanced a fair claim against Japan, but the 
foregoing illustrates success is anything but certain.  The international 
norms that Australia has invoked against Japan leave much to be 
desired in terms of protecting whales. The ICRW, over which the Court 
clearly has jurisdiction, is a “first generation” environmental treaty with 
a resource exploitation default position and generous “opt out” 
provisions. This posture is in clear tension with the more holistic and 
                                                      
48 DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).  
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contemporary conservation orientated obligations of  CITES and CBD.  
One of the most interesting aspects of the case will be whether the ICJ 
can take advantage of the opportunity to start reconciling these 
tensions.  
The uncertainty of success also raises the question, is the action 
worth it?  From an Australian perspective, the action has not 
insignificant political and economic costs.  However, as I have written 
elsewhere, the action is not without certain benefits. At a general level, 
it fosters an international rule of law, and surely that is a good thing. If 
Australia is to be true to its own traditions, it should pursue 
international justice through judicial means. Additionally, if the case is 
decided on the merits – even if adversely to Australia – we will have a 
definitive legal view from the ICJ on what has been the crux of a 
decades-long dispute between anti-whaling and pro-whaling states.   
One of the great deficiencies in the international legal system is the 
dearth of authoritative decisions about the meaning of disputed 
obligations. A binding third-party decision would permit the parties to 
move beyond an otherwise intractable dispute. This is as it should be.49
 
                                                      
49 Donald Anton, Whaling: Prospects for Success, THE INTERPRETER, June 9, 2010, 
available at http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/06/09/Whaling-Prospects-for-
ICJ-success.aspx. 
 
